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NOTES
for negligence to bar recovery in one case and merely to reduce
damages in the other would be inconsistent. It is necessary to
have a harmonious application of the admiralty doctrines of as-
sumption of risk and comparative negligence.
As a practical solution, the Court suggested that "any rule
of assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be
applied in conjunction with the established admiralty doctrine of
comparative negligence and in harmony with it. 1" Assumption
of risk may well serve to mitigate damages but must not be used
to completely bar recovery. Consequently, the Court applied the
rule of comparative negligence and the decision seems to be
correct.
J.D.M.
BANKS AND BANKING-DUTIES OF A DEPOSITOR TO His BANK-
STATUTES LIMITING TIME WITHIN WHICH SUITS MAY BE INSTI-
TUTED TO ENFORCE DRAWEE'S LIABILITY ON FORGED OR ATERED
CHECKS-An employee of the plaintiff, who had full charge of
his employer's check book, forged the latter's signature as drawer
and forged the indorsements of certain of plaintiff's employees
as payees to a number of checks in a skillfully executed series of
forgeries extending over a period of three years. Although the
plaintiff had not given notice of the forgeries in accordance with
the terms of Act 163 of 1934,1 he brought suit against the drawee
bank to recover the amount of the forged checks, which had
been paid by the drawee and charged to his account. The trial
court held Act 163 of 1934 to be unconstitutional on the ground
that the object of its provisions was not sufficiently indicated
by its title, but maintained the plea of prescription as to all
checks returned more than one year prior to the institution of
the suit. On appeal it was held that (1) the statute is constitu-
tional, (2) it is applicable to those checks on which both the
payee's indorsement and the drawer's signature were forged, and
(3) the plaintiff's suit was barred by failure to comply with the
17. Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed.
261 (1939).
1. La. Act 163 of 1934, § 1 (Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 675.1] limits the
time within which the depositor must notify the bank of forged or raised
checks and checks payable to fictitious persons, to one year after the
return of the paid vouchers or notice that they are ready for delivery, if
the bank is to be held liable to the depositor for payment thereof.
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terms of the statute. Barret v. First Nat. Bank of Shreveport, 191
La. 945, 186 So. 741 (1939).
In receiving ordinary deposits, a bank impliedly undertakes
to honor checks only in accordance with the genuine order of the
depositor.2 A drawee bank, although free from negligence in pay-
ing an altered check or a forged check purporting to have been
signed by a depositor, is not entitled to debit pro tanto the deposi-
tor's account; it must be considered as making payment out of its
own funds, provided that the depositor has not led the bank
reasonably to believe that the check is genuine and that he has
otherwise acted prudently."
Formerly, great uncertainty existed as to whether any obli-
gation whatever fell upon the depositor to examine the canceled
checks returned to him in order to determine if any of them
were forged or raised.4 A number of early cases held that there
was no such duty of examination resting upon the depositor,5
but since he could easily discover a forgery of his signature the
reasonableness of a rule imposing some duty upon him soon be-
came apparent.8 By the later decisions and the great weight of
authority,7 the rendering by a bank to a depositor of a periodi-
2. Otis Elevator Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 163 Cal. 31, 124 Pac. 704. 41
L.R.A. (N.S.) 529 (1912); Franklni v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 298, 55 P. (2d) 232 (1936).
"The duty of a bank in respect of paying out a depositor's money is
to pay it out only by his authorization. The bank owes the depositor the
amount of his deposit less his authorized payments. . . . Because of their
contractual relation the bank is in the first instance absolutely bound to
restore to the depositor all amounts paid on forged checks although it was
free from negligence in not detecting the forgeries." Wussow v. Badger
State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 469, 234 N.W. 720, 721 (1931).
3. Laborde v. Consolidated Ass'n of Planters, 4 Rob. 190, 39 Am. Dec.
517 (La. 1843); Etting v. Commercial Bank, 7 Rob. 459 (La. 1844); Board
of Education v. National Union Bank, 121 N.J. Law 177, 1 A. (2d) 383
(1938); Schenke v. Central Trust Co., 58 Ohio App. 441, 16 N.E. (2d) 700
(1938).
4. See Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 95 Cal. App. 338, 340, 272 Pac. 799,
800 (1928).
5. (1) Weisser v. Denlson, 10 N.Y. 68, 61 Am. Dec. 731 (1854), which has
been disapproved by later New York decisions: Stumpp v. Bank of New
York, 212 App. Div. 608, 209 N.Y. Supp. 396 (1925); Takenaka v. Bankers'
Trust Co., 132 Misc. 322, 229 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1928), affirmed 225 App. Div.
860, 233 N.Y. Supp. 905 (1929), appeal dismissed 251 N.Y. 521, 168 N.E.
412 (1929). (2) Manufacturers' Nat. Bank v. Barnes, 65 Ill. 69, 16 Am. Rep.
576 (1872), which has been followed: Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Nichols &
Shepard Co., 223 Ill. 41, 79 N.E. 38, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 752 (1906); Rettig v.
Southern Illinois Nat. Bank, 147 Ill. App. 193 (1909).
6. See Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Co. of California, 95 Cal. App. 338, 340,
272 Pac. 799, 800 (1928).
7. Cosmopolitan State Bank v. Lake Shore Trust & Sav. Bank, 343 11.
347, 175 N.E. 583 (1931); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & H.
Sav. Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185, 75 A.L.R. 1273 (1930); Deer Island
cal account (whether in a balanced passbook or in a statement
accompanied by the canceled checks) imposes upon the depositor
the obligation of examining the account with reasonable care and
promptness and of reporting any irregularities within a reason-
able time." The depositor's failure to notify his bank after he
knows, or should know, that it has paid a forged check and
charged it to his account, will under ordinary circumstances
result in unfavorable consequences. The theoretical basis and the
extent of these consequences are matters about which there is
a variety of judicial opinion. Some courts have based their de-
cisions upon the well-known doctrines of ratification,° adoption, 1
or estoppel'2 -consequently reaching the result that the bank
could quite properly charge the entire amount of the false checks
to the account of the depositor. 8 The better considered author-
ities hold the negligent depositor responsible only to the extent of
the damage which is the proximate consequence of his negli-
gence.1 4 Regardless of the theory upon which a depositor's respon-
Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116 (1933);
Bank of Occoquan v. Bushey, 156 Va. 25, 157 S.E. 764 (1931); Wussow v.
Badger State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234 N.W. 720 (1931).
8. In Ohio, the conclusion has been reached that it is the duty of a
depositor to examine his returned vouchers for the discovery of alterations,
but that no duty is Imposed on him to examine them to determine whether
his own signature has been forged. Notes (1921) 15 A.L.R. 159, 161, citing
Cincinnati Nat. Bank v. Creasy, 100 Ohio Dec. Reprint 121, 18 Ohio L.J.
410 (1887).
The duty of the depositor to examine returned vouchers and report
errors is a duty to the bank and cannot be invoked in favor of others.
Sprague v. West Hudson County Trust Co., 92 N.J. Eq. 639, 114 AtI. 344,
17 A.L.R. 952 (1921).
9. Arant, Forged Checks-The Duty of the Depositor to his Bank (1922)
31 Yale L.J. 598.
10. See Hardy & Bros. v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562, 569 (1879).
Notice the language of De Feriet v. Bank of America, 23 La. Ann. 310,
311 (1871): "Under these circumstances, it is clear that the plaintiff can-
not be heard to disavow the check.... So far as was in his power, he con-
doned this offense of his book-keeper, and made the transaction his own."
11. See Hardy & Bros. v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562, 569 (1879). Cf.
Dana v. National Bank of the Republic, 132 Mass. 156, 159 (1882).
12. Notes (1921) 15 A.L.R. 159, 169, and authorities there cited.
13. For a discussion of the various theories advanced for holding a
depositor liable to his bank when he had neglected to properly examine
returned vouchers, see Arant, supra note 9.
14. Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 219, 63 N.E. 969 (1902),
approved in Note (1902) 2 Col. L. Rev. 490.
Notice the language of First Nat. Bank v. Allen, 100 Ala. 476, 480, 14
So. 335, 337 (1893): "The extent of the liability of the depositor is commen-
surate with the loss sustained in consequence of his neglect of duty; no
more, no less. It would be unjust, unfair to the depositor, not sanctioned
by any correct principle of law, to permit the bank to invoke the doctrine
of ratification or estoppel which would exempt the bank from all liability
incurred by its own neglect in the payment of the forged check, and in
many cases inflict upon the depositor a greater loss than that caused to
the bank by his neglect of duty."
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sibility is said to be based, the courts are substantially agreed that
the bank would have a good defense as to other false checks the
negotiation of which proximately resulted from the depositor's
failure to give prompt notice of prior forgeries or alterations."5
A depositor is not presumed to know the signature of a
payee or other indorser and is therefore under no duty to ex-
amine their indorsements.16 This rule is applicable even where
an agent in the employ of the depositor has forged the payee's
indorsement."' Under certain exceptional circumstances, how-
ever, it may become the duty of the depositor to examine re-
turned statements and canceled checks to determine the gen-
uineness of indorsements. 1 A fortiori, if the depositor actually
discovers the forged indorsements, failure to notify the bank
within a reasonable time will render him responsible for any
loss which might have been averted by a prompt notification."
A bank which is itself guilty of negligence in failing to discover
an alteration or forgery cannot avoid responsibility on the ground
of the depositor's negligence. 20
If a depositor examines returned checks with due diligence
but the forgery or alteration is so skillful that he does not dis-
cover it, his failure will not shift to him the loss which had fallen
upon the bank in the first instance.21 In the absence of statute,
15. Sommer v. Bank of Italy Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 190 Cal.
App. 370, 293 Pac. 98 (1930). See also Glassel Development Co. v. Citizens'
Nat. Bank, 191 Cal. 375, 216 Pac. 1012 (1923); Deer Island Fish & Oyster
Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116 (1933).
16. Cosmopolitan State Bank v. Lake Shore, Trust & Say. Bank, 343
I1. 347, 175 N.E. 583 (1931); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Albia State
Bank, 214 Iowa 541, 239 N.W. 4 (1931); American Sash & Door Co. v.
Commerce Trust Co., 332 Mo. 98, 56 S.W. (2d) 1034 (1932); National Surety Co.
v. Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169 N.E. 372 (1929); Guardian Say. & L. Ass'n
v. Liberty State Bank, 60 S.W. (2d) 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
17. Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & H. Sav. Bank, 252
Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185, 75 A.L.R. 1273 (1930).
18. C. E. Erickson Co. v. Iowa Nat. Bank, 211 Iowa 495, 230 N.W. 342
(1930), where the plaintiff's treasurer failed to compare checks submitted
to him by the payroll clerk with the work cards and clock cards as required
by plaintiff's checking system; McLaughlin v. National City Bank, 228 App.
Div. 337, 239 N.Y. Supp. 598 (1930), where the stubs in the checkbook showed
payments to certain creditors were greatly in excess of the amount shown
In the bills payable book to be due, and checks were in some Instances dupli-
cations of previous checks to the same payee.
19. National Surety Co. v. Manhattan Co., 252 N.Y. 247, 169 N.E. 372,
67 A.L.R. 1113 (1929).
20. Leather Mfrs.' Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96, 6 S.Ct. 657, 29
L.Ed. 811 (1886); Union Tool Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank,
192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424, 28 A.L.R. 1417 (1923); Wussow v. Badger State
Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234 N.W. 720 (1931).
21. Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 166 Miss. 162,
146 So. 116 (1933).
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the question of the depositor's diligence is one of fact rather than
of law.22 What is a reasonably prompt notice of a forgery or an
alteration depends upon the circumstances of the case, 2  among
which may be enumerated: the nature of the transaction, the
relation of the parties, their distance from each other and the
means of communication between them, and the usual course of
business.2 4
The examination of the bank statement and canceled checks
may be made by the depositor himself or may be entrusted to an
employee whom he believes to be honest and competent,2 5 even
though the examination by the latter fails to disclose irregulari-
ties which would have been apparent to the depositor.26 How-
ever, such agent must use ordinary diligence, and if he himself
commits forgeries which mislead the bank, the depositor is not
protected, in the absence of at least reasonable diligence in super-
vising the agent's conduct. 27
In accordance with the recommendation of the American
Bankers Association, 28 many jurisdictions have passed statutes ex-
pressly limiting the time within which the depositor must notify
the bank of forged or altered checks.23 The time limits thus im-
posed range from thirty days to two years after the return to the
depositor of the paid vouchers or notice that they are ready for
delivery.8 0 Since these statutes do not in any way affect the
duties of the depositor existing before their passage, a depositor
who fails to give prompt notice of discovered irregularities8' is
not protected merely because the limitation period has not run.
22. Frankini v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 12 Cal. App.
(2d) 298, 55 P. (2d) 232 (1936).
23. United States v. National Bank of the Republic, 2 Mackey 289 (D.C.
1883).
24. 7 Am. Jur. (1937) 369, §514.
25. Leather Mfrs.' Nat. Bank v. Morgan, 117 U.S. 96, 6 S.Ct. 657, 29 L.Ed.
811 (1886); Kenneth Invest. Co. v. National Bank, 103 Mo. App. 613, 77
S.W. 1002 (1903); Clark v. National Shoe & Leather Bank, 32 App. Div. 316,
52 N.Y. Supp. 1064 (1898).
26. Shipman v. Bank of State, 126 N.Y. 318, 27 N.E. 371, 22 Am. St. Rep.
821, 12 L.R.A. 791 (1891).
27. Whitney Trust & Say. Bank v. Jurgens-Fowler Co., 180 La. 445,
156 So. 460 (1934); Frederick A. Potts & Co. v. Lafayette Nat. Bank, 269 N.Y.
181, .4199 N.E. 50 (1935). Cf. Deer Island Fish & Oyster Co. v. First Nat.
Bank, 166 Miss. 162, 146 So. 116 (1933).
28. 1 Paton, Digest (1926) 342, § 2013.
29. 5 Michie, Banks and Banking (1932) 543, §283; Arant, supra note 9,
at 616, n. 42.
30. 1 Paton, Digest (1926) 342, §2013. Such statutes, of course, are pros-
pective and not retroactive. Pratt v. Union Nat. Bank, 79 N.J. Law 117, 75
Atl. 313 (1909).
31. Ward v. First Nat. Bank, 224 Mo. App. 472, 27 S.W. (2d) 1066 (1930).
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In conformity with the rule of statutory construction that an
express exception is not to be extended beyond the fair import of
its terms,82 such statutory enactments, being in derogation of the
general commercial law,83 are strictly constructed. 4 These enact-
ments have been held to relate exclusively to the liability of the
drawee bank and not to afford a defense to a collecting bank sued
by the drawee8 5 They are not applicable to actions by a depositor
against a drawee who has paid a genuine check under a forged
indorsement;8 6 but, under the strict terms of the statute, they ap-
ply only to actions involving forgeries peculiarly within the
knowledge of the depositor (i. e., forgeries of his own signature)
and alterations upon the face of the instrument.17
Some statutory enactments requiring notice of forged or al-
tered checks within a certain period, such as those of New York,
Iowa, and apparently Louisiana,8 8 deal with substantive rights
and terminate liability unless notice is given within the period
required. 9 Others, such as the California statute, do not deal with
substantive rights but merely affect the remedy by limiting the
time within which actions may be commenced.40 Where the stat-
ute is considered a statute of limitations, it begins to run from the
32. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523, 277
Pac. 354 (1929).
33. A statute limiting the liability of the drawee bank has been held
to control the general rule of the California law that there is no limitation
statute for actions to recover money deposited in a bank. Union Tool Co.
v. Farmers' & Merchants' Nat. Bank, 192 Cal. 40, 218 Pac. 424, 28 A.L.R. 1417
(1923).
34. Kleinman v. Chase Nat. Bank, 124 Misc. Rep. 173, 207 N.Y. Supp. 191
(1924).
La. Act 163 of 1934 apparently applies also to savings banks and trust
companies. See La. Act 45 of 1902, § 7, as amended by Act 238 of 1910,
§ 1, and Act 146 of 1926, § 1 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 5881.
35. American Exch. Nat. Bank v. Yorkville Bank, 122 Misc. Rep. 616, 204
N. Y. Supp. 621 (1924).
36. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Continental Nat. Bank, 98 Cal. App. 523,
277 Pac. 354 (1929); McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211
N.W. 542, 52 A.L.R. 1297 (1926); First Nat. Bank v. United States Nat. Bank,
100 Ore. 264, 197 Pac. 547, 14 A.L.R. 479 (1921).
37. Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & H. Say. Bank, 252
Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185, 75 A.L.R. 1273 (1930).
88. "It is to be observed that the statute is not strictly a statute of
prescription. It Is more in the nature of a statute of peremption. It does not
declare that all causes of actions upon forged checks shall be prescribed
after one year, but It declares that all such actions shall be brought within
one year. Under the statute, the depositor has a right of action for one
year to enforce liability of a bank on a forged check. After the lapse of
that period, his right of action is gone." Barret v. First Nat. Bank, 191 La.
945, 956-957, 186 So. 741, 745 (1939).39. See Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 95 Cal. App. 338, 340, 272 Pac.
799, 800 (1928).
40. Atwell v. Mercantile Trust Co., 95 Cal. App. 338, 272 Pac. 799 (1928).
time the false checks are delivered to the depositor or notice is
given him that they are ready for delivery,' rather than from the
time the forgery is discovered or the time when the depositor de-
mands payment.'2
The modem tendency of Louisiana courts is to maintain that
the object of a statute is sufficiently indicated by its title when
such title directs attention to the general subject so that all per-
sons in interest are placed upon notice to make inquiry into the
statute itself.48 In keeping with this tendency, the court in the in-
stant case properly held Act 163 of 1934"4 to be constitutional. The
court was also correct in holding that checks, on which both the
payee's indorsement and the drawer's signature were forged, are
within the intendment of Act 163 of 1934. Such statutes are logi-
cally applicable to those instruments which are void at their in-
ception regardless of whether the indorsement of the payee is
subsequently forged or not.5 The result is in complete accord
with sound commercial policy.
F. H. O'N.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DENIAL OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS-EXCLUSION OF NEGROES FROM JURIEs-Defendant, a ne-
gro, based a motion to quash an indictment for murder on an al-
leged denial of the equal protection of the laws by a systematic
exclusion of negroes from the jury venire box because of their race
or color. The trial judge ordered a new petit jury panel; but he re-
fused to quash the indictment on the ground that the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant were not affected since the mere
presentment of an indictment is not evidence of guilt. On appeal,
41. Intimidation by a drunkard husband may incline the courts to be
lenient toward a wife for her delay in notification and to allow her to recover
against the drawee bank even though the period of limitations has run.
Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga. App. 248, 129 S.E. 170 (1925).
However, where the wife failed to give notice of forgeries for more than
60 days after her husband abandoned her and for more than three years
after the forgeries occurred, a Georgia court very properly held that such
laches rendered the defense of duress unavailable. Ponsell v. Citizens' &
Southern Bank, 35 Ga. App. 460, 133 S.E. 351 (1926).
42. California Vegetable Union v. Crocker Nat. Bank, 37 Cal. App. 743,
174 Pac. 920 (1918).
43. State v. Thrift Oil & Gas Co., 162 La. 165, 110 So. 188 (1926);
State v. Terrell, 181 La. 974, 160 So. 781 (1935).
44. Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 675.1.
45. See Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, § 124, La. Act 64 of 1904,
§ 124 [Dart's Stats. (1932) § 9141.
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